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In a carefully conceived and well-regarded article, Professor 
Akil Amar has advanced a two-tier theory of congressional control 
over federal jurisdiction. I He posits a mandatory tier of cases con-
sisting of the first three heads of jurisdiction in Article III, Section 
2: "arising under" litigation, admiralty cases2 and cases "affecting 
Ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls." Within this 
mandatory tier, Congress is free to restrict the Supreme Court's ap-
pellate jurisdiction only insofar as the inferior federal courts are 
vested with jurisdiction over the excluded cases.3 Article III's re-
maining "Party" controversies are in the second or permissive tier. 
The most appealing aspect of the two-tier thesis is that it seems 
to provide a principled basis, drawn from the very text of Article 
III, that renders one of the obviously most important heads of juris-
diction mandatory while leaving comparatively less important 
heads permissive. The textual keystone is the selective use of the 
word "all" in Article III, Section 2: "The judicial Power shall ex-
tend to all cases" in the mandatory first tier, but the modifier "all" 
is missing from the discretionary second tier of controversies. Pro-
fessor Amar infers that Article III requires complete aggregate vest-
ing of jurisdiction over the cases modified by "all" but leaves the 
other controversies to Congress's discretion. This construction, 
however, is only one of several possible readings of the pertinent 
text. There are at least two other readings, both of which treat the 
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selective use of "all" as being no more significant than the superfi-
cial distinction between "Cases" and "Controversies" in the same 
section of the Constitution. Furthermore these two alternative 
readings are more in harmony with Section 2's fundamental 
purpose. 
The first alternative reading turns on the possibility that the 
difference in wording was accidental. Experience in drafting docu-
ments that detail and regulate complex relationships suggests that 
perfection is unattainable, especially when working under time con-
straints. Inconsistencies like the presence or absence of "all" in Ar-
ticle III inevitably creep into the most carefully drafted documents. 
Furthermore, Article III was a collective effort. The first tier of 
Section 2 may have been written originally by a member of the Con-
vention's Committee of Detail who used the word "Cases" modified 
by an express "all." The second tier may have been written by a 
fellow drafter who preferred the word "Controversies" modified by 
an obvious but implicit "all." After the two tiers were joined, these 
insignificant inconsistencies of style were never resolved. This alter-
native reading is necessarily a matter of conjecture. There is no 
extant comprehensive record of the Committee of Detail's internal 
drafting process. 
Another possible reading draws more directly upon Article 
III's superficial distinction between "Cases" and "Controversies." 
Some judges have suggested that "Cases" denotes a concept broader 
than "Controversies"-that cases include criminal litigation while 
controversies are strictly civil.4 If this is so, the modifier "all" could 
be read as a stylistic emphasis of this distinction. Again, however, 
there would be an implicit "all" insofar as the civil controversies in 
the second tier are concerned. 
These alternative readings, standing alone, are little more than 
mind-games that lawyers play when parsing the written word. The 
general structure of Article III provides a more serious objection. 
Professor Amar sees Article III's list of cases and controversies as a 
limit to congressional power to curtail federal jurisdiction, but most 
people have viewed the list primarily as a limit on congressional 
power to expand jurisdiction.s Professor Amar presumably agrees' 
that Article III contains a negative inference that federal judicial 
power may not extend to unlisted cases. The two-tier thesis does 
not reject this established and primary understanding of Article 
4. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 239 (1937). 
5. See, e.g., Hodgson v. Bowerbank, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 303 (1809) (Marshall, C.J.). 
The orthodox view of congressional power to curtail federal jurisdiction begins with the con-
stitutional text that expressly addresses curtaiiJTient. See U.S. Canst. art. Ill, § I (inferior 
courts); § 2, Second Paragraph (Supreme Court). 
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III's list of cases. Instead the thesis presses Article III's list into 
double service with quite unfortunate-indeed, unacceptable-
consequences. 
If the list limits congressional power both to enhance and to 
curtail jurisdiction, Congress appears to lack constitutional author-
ity to vest the federal courts with power over "all" the controversies 
in the second tier. For example, according to Professor Amar, Arti-
cle III's reference to "Controversies to which the United States 
shall be a Party" does not include all such cases for purposes of 
curtailing jurisdiction. If so, it must not include all United States 
litigation for purposes of vesting the courts with jurisdiction. The 
strange result is that the two-tier thesis seems to forbid the federal 
courts to hear some cases directly involving the national 
government. 
I note this constitutional double entendre for a limited purpose. 
If the constitutional text is to be taken seriously, the textual di-
lemma created by the two-tier theory must be resolved, and the res-
olution inevitably will involve a tortured construction of the 
constitutional text. The obvious solution to the dilemma is simply 
to decree that Article III has implicit "ails" for the purpose of de-
fining the judicial power of the United States but that these unspo-
ken "ails" flicker out of existence when the very same language is 
used to judge power to curtail jurisdiction. Such a reading is possi-
ble, but at that point the two-tier thesis can no longer claim to be a 
straightforward and hence plausible exegesis of constitutional text. 
Although the two-tier thesis can with some ingenuity be eased 
into the constitutional text, the thesis is even less plausible as a mat-
ter of historical analysis. For example, the allocation of cases be-
tween the discretionary and mandatory tiers is incoherent. If the 
framers and ratifiers actually thought that some cases involve such 
significant national interests that federal jurisdiction should be con-
stitutionally mandated, the presence of federal question and perhaps 
ambassador cases in the mandatory tier is plausible. But why are 
cases involving the United States itself relegated to the less impor-
tant second tier? Surely the leaders in the early Republic did not 
view government litigation as less important than cases in the first 
tier. Until convincing historical evidence is adduced to the con-
trary, we may plausibly believe that such an anomalous dichotomy 
was not intended. 
I have seen no direct evidence that anyone associated with the 
framing, ratification, or initial implementation of the Constitution 
ever espoused the two-tier thesis. With two dubious exceptions, all 
the historical sources advanced in favor of the two-tier thesis easily 
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can be read otherwise, as statements of actions Congress might 
profitably take under Article III. One exception comes during the 
course of an extended dictum in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, in which 
Justice Story noted the inconsistent use of "all" in Article III and 
seemed to view the inconsistency as significant.6 He was, however, 
only nine years old when the Constitutional Convention met in 
Philadelphia. Furthermore, he carefully stated that his textual 
analysis was tentative.? Finally, in other parts of his opinion he 
advocated a broader theory of mandatory vesting that is inconsis-
tent with the two-tier thesis.s 
In addition to Justice Story's tentative dictum that he himself 
may have rejected, a preliminary version of Article III clearly did 
provide for two tiers of mandatory and discretionary jurisdiction. 9 
This draft, however, is what it is: a preliminary draft. We do not 
know its relation to the drafting process, but we do know that this 
clearly two-tiered language was deleted from the final draft. We 
also know that Edmund Randolph, who wrote the preliminary 
draft, did not believe that the final version of Article III embodied 
the two-tier thesis. As Attorney General of the United States, he 
reported that Congress had plenary power to enact a general 
amount-in-controversy limitation that absolutely precluded both 
original and appellate jurisdiction.w Randolph's proposal was ap-
plicable to cases in both tiers of jurisdiction and was expressly based 
upon the traditional understanding of congressional power over fed-
eral jurisdiction. 
Randolph's report cannot be dismissed as a sport. In urging 
ratification of the proposed Constitution, Oliver Ellsworth, who 
also served on the Committee of Detail in Philadelphia, expressly 
endorsed the traditional understanding of plenary legislative power 
over federal jurisdiction.II In the first Congress Ellsworth gave 
6. Amar, supra note I, at 210-15. 
7. 14 U.S. (I Wheaton) 304, 336 (1816) ("We do not, however, profess to place any 
implicit reliance upon" the selective use of the word all); id. at 334 ("From this difference of 
phraseology, perhaps, a difference of constitutional intention may, with propriety, be 
inferred"). 
8. See the discussion in H. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE 
FEDERAL SYSTEM (3d ed. 1983) at 366-68. 
9. Amar, supra note I, at 243. 
10. H.R. Rep., 1st Cong., 3d Sess. (Dec. 31, 1790), reprinted in I AMERICAN STATE 
PAPERS: MISCELLANEOUS 21-36 (W. Lowrie & W. Franklin eds. 1834). For a more detailed 
discussion of Randolph's report, see Casto, The First Congress's Understanding of Its Author-
ity Over the Federal Courts' Jurisdiction, 1120-22 [hereinafter Casto]; Holt, "Federal Courts 
as the Asylum to Federal Interests": Randolph's Report. The Benson Amendment, and the 
"Original Understanding" of the Federal Judiciary, 36 BuFFALO L. REv. 341 (1988). 
II. See Casto, supra note 10, at 1104. During the ratification process, Roger Sherman 
and James Iredell also advocated extensive, even plenary, congressional power over federal 
jurisdiction. /d. 
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force to this understanding when he drafted the Judiciary Act of 
1789, which completely excluded a number of federal question cases 
from original and appellate federal jurisdiction.12 For example, the 
Act did not allow federal jurisdiction over a tremendous number of 
significant cases arising under the Treaty of Paris concluding the 
Revolutionary War, the most important treaty in United States his-
tory. This and other curtailments of jurisdiction were passed by a 
Congress that included fifty-four members who had been delegates 
to the Philadelphia Convention or their state ratification 
conventions. 
Ellsworth reaffirmed his understanding after he became the 
third Chief Justice of the United States. In Wiscart v. D'Auchy, he 
formally considered the issue of congressional control and wrote the 
opinion of the Court that embraced plenary congressional power 
over the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction.I3 Wiscart itself, 
was a diversity case from the discretionary second tier of Article 
III, but a companion case was a suit in admiralty from the 
mandatory first tier.I4 Under the two-tier thesis, Ellsworth should 
have recognized the two consolidated cases as requiring quite sepa-
rate and distinct analyses, but he espoused a unitary theory of con-
gressional authority. 
Justice Wilson's dissent in Wiscart is even more damning. Like 
Ellsworth and Randolph, Wilson had been a member of the Com-
mittee of Detail at Philadelphia. Wilson's opinion is devoted almost 
entirely to statutory construction, and his precise position on Con-
gress's authority to curtail jurisdiction is difficult to assess. Never-
theless, he briefly touched on the subject when he wrote, "Even, 
indeed, if a positive restriction existed by law, it would, in my judg-
ment, be superseded by the superior authority of the constitutional 
provision."Is Because the consolidated admiralty case was an ap-
peal from an inferior federal court, congressional curtailment of the 
Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction clearly was permissible 
under the two-tier thesis. Perhaps Wilson had in mind something 
like Henry Hart's "essential functions" analysis,I6 but he cannot 
possibly have been writing about the two-tier thesis. I? 
12. For a complete discussion of the first Judiciary Act's implications for congressional 
power over federal jurisdiction including the ideas in the text of the paragraph accompanying 
this note, see Casto, supra note I 0. 
13. See id. at 1122-23. 
14. See Wiscart, 3 U.S. (3 Dallas) 321, 324 n• (reporter's note) (1796). See also id. at 
324 (Ellsworth, C.J.) (noting that the Court intended to address cases of "equity [and] admi-
ralty jurisdiction"). 
15. !d. at 325 (Wilson, J., dissenting). 
16. See infra notes 26-27 and accompanying text. 
17. A lawyer might explain Wilson's cryptic sentence in Wiscart as based upon some 
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The theory of plenary power expressly endorsed by the Found-
ing generation has become settled tradition. The combined impact 
of Osborn v. Bank of United States 1s and Louisville & Nashville RR 
v. Mottley 19 excludes a vast array of federal question litigation from 
the district courts' original jurisdiction. Some federal question 
cases must therefore be filed in state court. If the federal question 
proves not to control the outcome, the Supreme Court cannot re-
view any issues of fact, with the result that a case in the first tier will 
never receive a full hearing in an Article III court. This complete 
absence of federal jurisdiction can only be reconciled with the two-
tier thesis by another manipulation of Article III's text. Perhaps 
the mandatory "alls" in the first tier refer to issues of law in "arising 
under" cases but not all issues of fact. Such a subtle reading is pos-
sible but not readily apparent from the text. 
The historical evidence is not kind to the two-tier thesis. Three 
of the five members of the Committee of Detail who drafted Article 
III simply did not draw Professor Amar's suggested distinction be-
tween the two posited tiers. Randolph and Wilson took positions 
that seem quite inconsistent with the distinction. Furthermore 
Randolph and Ellsworth clearly had a unitary understanding of the 
issue. This apparent antipathy to the two-tier thesis is a plausible 
explanation of the Committee of Detail's apparent rejection of the 
preliminary draft, which clearly would have established a two-tier 
structure. In the two hundred years since the Committee's decision, 
only two people, Justice Story and Professor Amar, appear to have 
given any credence to the thesis. Story was expressly tentative and 
refused to place complete reliance upon the thesis, but some hun-
dred fifty years later Professor Amar is quite enthusiastic. If the 
two-tier thesis was actually the common understanding of the time, 
why is the evidence so elusive? 
Although the two-tier thesis has textual problems and little his-
torical basis, the thesis is perhaps easier to justify as a matter of 
constitutional policy. Rather then restate objections that have been 
suggested by others,2o I will limit myself to one additional 
constitutional theory that supplements rather than supplants the two·tier thesis. This imagi-
native explanation is logically possible but historically implausible in the absence of support-
ing historical evidence. 
18. 22 U.S. (9 Wheaton) 738 (1824) (The Constitution's "arising under" language inter-
preted as including all cases in which a federal question might appear). 
19. 211 U.S. 149 (1908) (federal question jurisdiction statutes limited to cases in which 
the federal question appears on the face of the well-pleaded complaint). 
20. See H. HART & H. WECHSLER supra note 8, at 386-87. In addition to these objec-
tions, the idea of protective jurisdiction as a form of federal question jurisdiction is difficult to 
reconcile with the two-tier thesis. By definition, protective jurisdiction is authorized by Arti-
cle III's "arising under" clause, but cases within the federal courts' protective jurisdiction 
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consideration. 
The "arising under" cases provide the laboratory for testing 
the wisdom of the two-tier theory. As a matter of policy-though 
perhaps not constitutional text-this theory of mandatory vesting 
could be limited to cases involving constitutional rules of decision. 
After all, Congress and the president have plenary power over trea-
ties and other sub-constitutional federal laws. Therefore, a curtail-
ment of jurisdiction over these subconstitutional cases might fairly 
be viewed as being properly, albeit indirectly, based upon substan-
tive lawmaking authority. This whittling away leaves the two-tier 
thesis in its strongest configuration: The Constitution mandates 
federal jurisdiction (either appellate or original) over all cases in-
volving issues of constitutional law but gives Congress general dis-
cretion to curtail jurisdiction over all other cases. 
I believe that even this trimmed down core of mandatory vest-
ing is unacceptable constitutional policy. Any theory of mandatory 
vesting must deal effectively with cases in which there is a serious 
disagreement between Congress and the Supreme Court and in 
which Congress has consciously decided to muzzle the Court by 
curtailing jurisdiction. Fortunately and not coincidentally, this 
type of constitutional crisis has been quite rare in our history. The 
obvious prototype is found in the era of Reconstruction2t-in Mc-
Cardle and Yerger. Perhaps Congress's postponement of the even-
tual decision in Marbury v. Madison is another example.22 
By definition these crucial-in my opinion all-important-
cases involve predominantly political crises that directly challenge 
the Court's basic role under the Constitution. When we recall that 
Congress's view of the underlying substantive issue may be superior 
to the Court's,2J the essentially political nature of these crises is 
highlighted. In these sui generis crises, the Court must consider the 
extent of its political capital and its consequent ability to vindicate 
its vision of the underlying principle of substantive constitutional 
law that has provoked the crisis. An ali-or-nothing, absolute rule 
like the two-tier thesis is simply too brittle a tool for crafting an 
literally cannot be identified without an act of Congress. See Mishkin, The Federal "Ques-
tion" in the District Courts, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 157, 184-96 (1953); Wechsler, Federal Juris-
diction and the Revision of the Judicial Code, 13 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 216, 224-25 
(1948). Therefore either protective jurisdiction must be rejected or the Supreme Court's ap-
pellate jurisdiction over state court adjudications must be expanded to include cases in which 
Congress could have but has not vested the district courts with protective jurisdiction. 
21. See HART & WECHSLER supra note 8, at 364-66. 
22. See Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DUKE L.J. I, 5 
(1969). 
23. Cf Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 101 (muzzling federal district courts that 
were abusing their equity powers in labor disputes). 
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adequate judicial response to the congressional challenge. Flexibil-
ity is essential for the Court to protect its authority. Inflexible rules 
like the two-tier thesis provide grossly unrealistic guidelines for cop-
ing with intricately nuanced political crises. 
The two-tier thesis' inflexibility illustrates by negative example 
the primary value of Henry Hart's now-orthodox "essential func-
tions" theory. Hart reasoned that Article III's "exceptions" clause 
could not be plausibly read "as authorizing exceptions which engulf 
the rule [that the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction 
over the enumerated cases and controversies.]"24 He conceded that 
the limits upon Congress's exceptions power are difficult to mea-
sure. Nevertheless, he wrote: "It's not impossible for me to lay 
down a measure. The measure is simply that the exceptions must 
not be such as will destroy the essential role of the Supreme Court 
in the constitutional plan."25 
Critics of Hart's vision "emphasize the vague, slippery, open-
ended nature of the limit,"26 while others have attempted to remedy 
the deficiency by developing more precise definitions of the Court's 
essential functions. Both groups, however, misconceive the primary 
strength of Hart's theory. By keeping the definition of essential 
functions vague, the theory gives the Court room to maneuver when 
confronted with a constitutional crisis like the Reconstruction liti-
gation-in McCardle to acquiesce, then in Yerger to reassert its in-
dependence.27 Likewise the theory explains decisions like Lockerty 
v. Phillips in which the Court acquiesced in a curtailment of juris-
diction during World War II when the nation was fighting for its 
political life.zs The existence of vague but nevertheless real limits 
upon congressional power to curtail jurisdiction also provides con-
gressional defenders of the Court with ammunition to defeat a cur-
tailment at the outset and thus forestall a constitutional crisis. As 
academics sometimes forget but lawyers all should know, vagueness 
can be an important virtue. 
24. HART & WECHSLER 3d at 393. 
25. /d. at 394. 
26. Gunther, Congressional Power to Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction: An Opinion-
ated Guide to the Ongoing Debate, 36 STAN. L. REv. 895, 903 (1984). 
27. I do not mean to suggest that Professor Hart had this political rationale specifically 
in mind when he developed his theory. 
28. See HART & WECHSLER supra note 8, at 370-75. 
